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Abstract To what extent is the recently invented individual catch quota a form of real
property right? This article introduces six quantitative characteristics of all personal
interests in land and ruitural resources. It is shown that medieval fishing rights had
some of these characteristics, but these rights were not developed in the common law
of property. The article then turns to modem regulatory licenses and catch quotas
and examines the extent to which they embody property characteristics. In a
digression, the obstacles to political acceptance of the individual fishery property
concept are sun-eyed. The paper concludes by suggesting that catch quotas may
develop into shares in the fish stock or biomass itself.
Introduction
This study considers some older institutions and ideas from which systems of individual
quota rights to fisheries may have emerged. What makes such new systems appear? Can
they be regarded as new property institutions? Does an economic approach throw light
on their development?
It is now widely accepted that some official fisheries management and regulation
programs work better and cost less when they do not encourage fishermen to race for the
allowable catch. To this end they grant each participant a "right" to take a certain
number of fish per season.' In what sense does such a regime create a "property right?"
To what extent do alternative regimes also depend on individual rights? Thus a regime's
"rights content" and not its overall merit is the main topic. There are just too many
merit criteria: not only biological effectiveness, but also the international, regional,
class, and public revenue distribution of fish, income, and jobs. Already, in routinely
evaluating a single fishing regulation, the economist is forced to predict its effects on
both efficiency and equity. Evaluating fully a whole proposed fishing regime would force
the economist to predict its results in many more dimensions; then to weight them.^
Indeed there is yet another criterion: the particular costs of public enforcement, private
transactions, and start-up that run with a regime.
Therefore, this article deals mostly with the property rights characteristics of man-
agement regimes. It is enough to get people thinking about the different meanings and
mixtures of "institutions," govemment, property, and individual property rights without
asking them to form preferences about their procedural, static welfare, and distributional
Implications.
Definitions
Among those who think about institutions, the following ideas would be generally ac-
cepted. Institutions are socially recognized and supported procedures and rules. They
are unchanging, relative to the more rapid fluctuations of economic activities that they
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assist and constrain, for example: in a modem society, govemment itself is one institu-
tion, embodying in its constitution such institutionalized matters as the franchise, deci-
sion rules, division rules, division of powers, and so on. The system of property rights is
another example. Making up the system is a set of standard individual property "inter-
ests."
Among institutions, govemment is not necessarily paramount. Indeed, many con-
tractarian economists reason that when government and property institutions exist side
by side, one cannot fruitfully look to one as a source of reform in the other. Political
economy and political philosophy have been divided about whether the system of gov-
emment has emerged from the distribution of property rights, or the other way around.
Modem history certainly shows that govemment policies have not always succeeded in
imposing new non govemmental institutions, although economists who urge new
"rights-based" fishery regimes must believe that new property rights, like new tax
structures, are easily instituted.
What is more correct is that a nation's institutions may already include a set of
standard property interests that could be introduced into fishery regimes. If so, the
development of rights-based regimes will more likely be successful than if new individ-
ual interests with new characteristics must be introduced. The idea of "characteristics"
identifying distinct standard property interests or rights is discussed in the following
sections.
The third section presents a brief chronology of changes in anglo-saxon common law
conceming individual interests in fisheries. If the individual modem quota is to be seen
as a property right, what happened to analogous ancient fishery rights under English
common law? The discussion here illustrates that even absolute monarchs cannot lightly
create property institutions.
Section four sketches the development of modem fisheries' regulation, with special
reference to the private rights incorporated into successive schemes. One section con-
trasts rights and govemment as altemative bases for management. In the concluding
section I raise questions about the forces favoring, and opposing, a rights-based fishing
system.
Property Rights and Their Characteristics
To build up a definition of a property right, it is best to stay within the ideas made
familiar by the "economics of property rights." What most people think of as a right to
land is, more precisely, a person's real interest. The word real (as in the phrase "real
estate") means it pertains to immovable things like the soil, resources, and buildings,
and not to personal, movable things like livestock, equipment, or vessels. Many kinds of
interest in land could be invented. But the courts of most countries recognize only a few,
which we might describe as standard interests. Under most European systems of law, for
example, there is an interest generally known as freehold (or fee simple). Other standard
interests known in many countries are leasehold, easements, profits, strata titles, and
some related interests such as mining rights, rights of fishery, and appropriative water
rights.
Some of these are standard and distinctive on their own, whereas others—such as
riparian water rights, rights of fishery, easements, and rights to use a common—belong
to the owner because they "run with" other lands in which he or she has an interest.
Under real property law, these standard rights are generally valid in disputes aboutProperty Development in the Fishery 291
rights of possession and use against third parties and indeed society as a whole. This is a
powerful feature of interest in real property.
It seems clear that the catching rights conveyed or proposed by the national fisheries
policies mentioned above are, or would be, real and not just personal interests. They are
or might become analogous to the territorial interest held by farmers or their tenants.
They would be something more than a mere license, the primitive sort of right a motorist
acquires when allowed to drive into someone's field and look for a place to park. And
they would be more than an interest in personal property, such as that in a vessel or in a
fish already caught and in the bag.
Each standard interest in real property is distinguished by the characteristics it com-
bines. There are at least six of these. Different writers identify and define them differ-
ently. It is useful to regard each as continuous (not discrete or on/ofO and indeed numeri-
cal.^ The following list should adequately convey the idea of characteristics: duration,
fiexibility, exclusivity, quality of title, transferability, and divisibility.''
A useful way of visualizing a combination of characteristics in a particular interest
in land is to regard each as measured in its own units and along its own axis. Consider
owning rights to fish a stretch of river by holding standard interest, say a "fishery,"
conveying rights to catch one freshwater species in a particular time and place. This
interest, when held in that place, would yield particular amounts of each of the six
characteristics. On another river it might endow its owner with more or less of each of
the characteristics.'
Figure 1 can best be used to compare the combination of characteristics in one
standard interest with that in an altemative interest at the same location. Each combina-
tion is shown by the six-pointed, star-shaped figure formed by joining the measured
points on the six characteristic axes.*
The process of inventing new real property institutions can be thought of as the
process of changing the amount of one or more characteristics in a standard interest. For
example, as a fishing regime changes from a system of annually giving fishermen a
personal license to granting them tradeable 10-year quotas, the diagram would show a
small figure close around the origin swelling outward in at least four dimensions.
Chronology of Communal and Common-Law Rights
This section deals mostly with the English tradition, conceming fishing rights. There
were once, under common law, systems of private interests in fish ponds, and in both
freshwater and tidal fisheries, though not in offshore fisheries. What were they like?
What became of them? Were they a model for modem systems of rights-based fishing?
Early Individual Rights. The common law regarding individual property^ over fish was
not and is not a simple one. It depended on many things; whether it was swimming at
large or captured; and whether when at large it was to be found offshore, in tidal
streams, or in fresh water.*
While the fish was swimming at large, the common law concept of the capture of
wild things (ferae naturae) applied. Not unless a bird, fish, or wild animal had been
captured, killed, or impounded under domestic control was it subject to ownership as
personal property. Thus the interest of the owner of fish in a pond or tank would
correspond to that of a farmer in livestock.292 A. Scott
Flexibility
Duration Exclusivity
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Transferability
Figure 1. Six characteristics of interest in real property.
Rights to Fisheries. From the ownership of individual fish, we turn to early rights of
fishery (to catch fish). The characteristics of this right varied widely from one place to
another in the medieval period. The reason is probably that there had been nothing
automatic about including local fisheries in the original baronial grants by the Norman
conquerors. Many were withheld or retained by the crown for its own use or for subse-
quent grant to outsiders: towns, abbeys, and favorites. The barons and the outsiders in
their turn also granted interests in their fisheries in many ways. Consequently it is almost
meaningless to speak of the ownership or management of a "typical" medieval fishery.^
Tidal Fisheries: The "Public Right of Fishing." Medieval kings and barons couid grant
fishery rights anywhere. No distinction was made between salt and freshwater fishing.
Since all submerged lands were capable of private ownership, the overlying fisheries
could be in private hands. If the underlying tidal lands were too far offshore, then the
overlying fisheries there were classified as res nuUius~not anyone's property in the
common-law sense.
Typically, inshore tidal fisheries were in shallow estuaries and bays and could be
granted, with or without the adjoining shorelands, just like other parts of the crown
domain. Common law therefore would lead one to expect that inshore tidal fisheries
would gradually become private.
But that never really happened. Apparently as a result of the events that led to the
Magna Carta in 1215, the crown ceased to grant rights to inshore tidal fisheries.'°
On the face of it, the king's action is hard to reconcile with any economic hypothesis
about the limits to the creation of private rights. Why should the limits to the royal
granting of fishing rights be set at the tideline? It is of course, true that enforcement and
the quality of title are more costly to establish in tidal waters. Transactions between
neighboring owners could also be expensive. (Indeed, jurists and legal scholars did say
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there were res nullius.)" But many inshore tidal private weirs and fisheries already
existed and the rights to them were being successfully enforced, just as in inland fish-
eries. Whereas one might have expected that inland rights would have been altered to
make the tidal fisheries feasible'^ no such reshaping of rights was allowed to take place.
Instead ancient public fishing privileges were tolerated until open access to tidal waters
became the rule.
Inland, Freshwater Fisheries. The consequence of this snapping off of development of
individual tidal fishing rights is that the common law offers us no base case for a modem
maritime fishing right. We have no history of enforcement experience, legal conflict, or
incremental change to study. Consequently, for origins we must look to the fishing rights
that developed inland, in fresh water.
As already noted, history tells of a profusion of sources of interests in freshwater
fishing. Once granted, the owner's interest had most of the characteristics of a common-
law interest known as a profit-a-prendre. This gave its holder a right to enter an area and
remove something, such as wood or a mineral. Such rights could be exclusive and
transferable. We should note the diversity of such territorial fishing rights and, espe-
cially, of such rights when held in common.
Territorial Fisheries Rights. Many individual owners had both the land beneath or
adjoining the fishery, and the right of fishing. Both were often either part of a larger
surrounding parcel such as a manor, or severed from their surroundings and acquired
by an outside owner. Both were—and are today—exclusive, although this could mean
that different persons could possess it at different seasons or for special species. Both
could be leased out, traded, and divided. But neither possession of the stream itself,
nor ownership of the fish still swimming in it were included in an interest in a fish-
ery.'''
In medieval times many persons paid rent to the crown or lords for a lease or
freehold of severed or detached fishing rights; others utilized the fisheries on their own
lands. Today, many of these arrangements survive in England, and their existence is
confirmed by the publicity given to the fees charged by modem private and club fish-
eries in England. But statistical information about the frequency of individual territorial
fisheries remains private. Registries do not exist, and ownerships need not be revealed.
Territorial Fisheries in Common (Common of Fisheries). Such territorial rights could
also be granted to be owned and managed in common. This is the model for what would
today be called a communal or common-property fishery. Little has been written about it
or its frequency. It is said that "in many manors" and parishes or villages, the right of
fishery passed by custom or by copy of manorial roll.''* This might mean that both the
setting and the enforcement of each commoner's rights of fishing were very similar to
the "stinting" procedures for using the waste land and common fields. It is, however,
fwssible that the place of the fishery in the village was not common property but a
private source of revenue for the lord, like his mill, ferry, or bakery.'* Fishery payments
were made to lords,'^ but the evidence does not suggest whether the resource was
managed by the village or the lord's steward.
The development of private fisheries rights known to the common law began early,
before the Norman Conquest. It also ended early, at least so far as private rights to tidal
and offshore fisheries were concemed. When these were no longer granted, the concept
of public rights of fishing increasingly prevailed. Private rights did continue on inland294 A. Scott
fisheries, both those owned by landlords and those managed in common. But these were
and are strictly territorial, probably inapplicable to marine fisheries. Thus for centuries
there were essentially no changes in practice or ideas about the characteristics of marine
fishing rights. When changes did come, they were not in response to demands for reform
of the older private interests, but to the search for solutions to new concems about
fishery depletion and national sovereignty on the high seas.
Steps in Economists' Analysis of Fisheries* Regulation
19S0s: Property in Economists' Analysis
Although Gordon's original (1954) analysis dealt with common versus private property,
and analysis indicated his preference for "asset" rather than "interaction" analysis
(Mohring and Boyd 1971), he did not follow his Frank Knight model to the extent of
examining the possibility of an asset-ownership regime. In any case property aspects
were soon forgotten, as most other economists redirected his emphases to improving the
biological production function and to studying regulation.'^
Subsequent 1960s work took open access as inevitable. "Airvey (1964) introduced
Pigovian extemality analysis and much else in 1957. Thereafter analytical energy was
expended on altemative regulatory regimes, ranging from control over seasonal open-
ings to mesh sizes. Most authors felt that a tax on landings would be more efficient than
closings, but took Crutchfieid's advice that new taxes were not politic. (Hamlisch 1962,
pp. 354-426). Licenses, simply elements in these control schemes, were not analyzed as
rights.
1960s: Economic Instruments of Regulation
In the 1960s more progress was made in modeling the biology of the fishery than its
regulation. Starting perhaps with Cmtchield and Zeliner (1962), attempts were made to
match the dynamics of the biologists. Later, more sophisticated analytical models, con-
trol theory, and numerical simulation increased the power and scope of economic ap-
proaches.
Still, many of the most characteristic elements of real-world fishing were omitted,
such as long-distance migration, anadromous escapement, predator-prey ratios, and
schooling. So also were aspects of industry behavior: uncertainty in the search for
elusive fish stocks, investment decisions about vessel speed and capacity, and adjustment
to bad weather and physical danger.
A very simple model was used to analyze behavior of fishermen and compare possi-
ble policies. Economists seemed united in their opposition to fishery regulation by clo-
sures or gear limitations. "Economic" regulatory regimes were in favor for analysis. A
classification such as the following was typical:
1. Sole ownership (including aquaculture). Intemalizes both input and output deci-
sions.
2. License limitation. Restricts input by administratively rationing access by fisher-
men, vessels, or key gear.
3. Charges for licenses or taxes on inputs. Restricts inputs by levying charge on
entry or participation.Property Development in the Fishery 295
4. Individual catch quotas. Restricts output by administratively rationing amount of
catch or landing.
5. T^xes on catch. Restricts output by levying charge (royalty) on catch or landing.
We may dispose of separate discussion of the input tax or charge schemes (3) and (5)
first (Pearse 1982). In the form of a method of rationing fishing licenses by price, point
3 is an important complement to point 2. But we should note that some proposed a
charge on effort alone, without a fishing license scheme.
Likewise, when point 5 is regarded as the price of an individual catch quota, it is an
important complement to point 4. But we should recognize that many papers have advo-
cated a Pigovian landing fee alone. Thus points 3 and 5 can stand alone, but they are
omitted here as they are the negation of rights-based fishing.
That leaves us with points 1,2, and 4. Each of these has some of the characteristics
of a property right.
Sole ownership (1) had been designed to illustrate the internalized management of an
asset. To many economists it was an analytical device similar to the biologists' closed
pond fishery. As a kind of property, it was compared to the freehold ownership of a farm
(see Scott 1955a, and especially 1957). For example, a "Swiss Corporation" was a sole-
ownership fishery whose equity was owned by participating fishermen or fishing nations
(see Jones et al., 197; Munro 1979; Scott 1955).
Actually, sole ownership was more than a base case; there have been real world
instances: (1) freshwater, several stream and pond fisheries, under common law (as
discussed elsewhere in this article), (2) the Pacific fur seal fishery (discussed below),
(Christy and Scott 1965; Paterson and Wilen 1977; Waite 1985), (3) coastal salmon
runs assigned by custom or license to a particular Indian tribe, processor, or dealer
(Gregory and Barnes 1939), and (4) certain South African marine fisheries (see
Hamlisch 1967).
1960s: License and Entry Limitation
Let us look at point 2. During the long transitional period up to the mid-1970s, the
literature on limiting licenses mostly debated the ultimate distributional questions: how
many licensed vessels? which ones? at what initial price? what procedures?
Most economists wrote about limitation less as creating or destroying "rights" than
as a technical question: how could govemment reduce access while still continuing
closures, gear restrictions, and taking all responsibility for enforcement and stock pro-
tection.?
But the limitation did give licenses new characteristics. Whatever transferability
licenses possessed was praised for encouraging market allocation of units of labor and
capital between the fishery and other sectors. Whatever permanence and exclusivity they
possessed was praised, encouraging long-run vessel investment planning self-
enforcement of controls.'^ But little of the fisheries' literature recognized that limited
fishermens' licenses had increased exclusivity that might encourage participants to re-
place some govemment controls'' to collude to buy and retire extra vessels or extra
licenses;^*' or to agree on the sharing of the resource (Lewis 1982). If the market value of
transferable licenses had not begun to rise, the economic value of exclusivity might have
been missed altogether.
Vessel owners gladly assigned the transitional scaling-down process to govemment,
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allotments. This called for costly litigation or collective action (Cheung 1970; Libecap
and Johnson 1988; Libecap and Wiggins 1984).^' Govemments usually proposed to
admit only those vessels or owners already in the fishery, and to reduce them by natural
tumover. Eventually some govemments also introduced painfully negotiated phasing-in,
phasing-out, or buyback schemes to "compensate" those who were retired from the fieet
(Pearse 1979; Rettig 1984; see also Campbell 1981; Crutchfield 1981; MacDonald
1982; Scott and Neher 1981).
The importance of two decades of limited licensing for the development of rights-
based fishing might be summarized in two points. First, limited licensing began to be
identified, however vaguely, as creating new characteristics of old property interests.
For example, the buyback schemes, once proposed, suggested govemmental recognition
that an interest had been vested in the individual, and the recognition of native-American
fishing rights may have worked in the same direction. These developments probably
caused commentators to look further for other additions to the characteristics of fisher-
men's rights.
Second, to economists at least, license limitation without other reinforcing measures
induced such a sickening excess of investment in individual fishing capital, such exces-
sive preoccupation with racing and rivalry, and such costly dependence on public en-
forcement that analysts were challenged to look for something else. Individual quotas, or
communal control, were often mentioned.
1970s: Individual Rights in International Fishing
There is reason to believe that both the proceedings and the administration of interna-
tional agreements have been sources of concepts of individual rights. But the literature is
fragmentary.
We start with the disappearance of national commercial and naval sovereignty over
the high seas. After the sixteenth century, offshore fishing was free in waters beyond any
state's jurisdiction; although each vessel remained subject to its own nation's laws.
Under the resulting "freedom of the seas" doctrine, European vessels were free to cross
the ocean in search of the cod fisheries, and later to circle the globe in whale and seal
fisheries. Except in a band called the territorial sea, usually three miles deep, a fisher-
man from the adjacent coastal state had no better right to fish than one from a distant
state. As res nullius, the high seas were beyond the domain where a person could be
granted any rights or license that would be valid against anyone except his own country-
But coastal states differed in their independence, some being forced to concede
extraterritorial rights to fish their inland and territorial waters (with or without rights to
land, purchase supplies, repair nets, process, and trade) to more powerful foreign states
(see Innis 1954 for refs.). Did these states ever ration out these new rights among their
own vessels? The few accounts available suggest not, any of the foreign vessels was
implicitly licensed to exploit the waters of the subject coastal state.
It appears that one exception to this rule was in the nineteenth-century fur seal treaty,
implemented in 1911. Here the distant water states, Japan and Britain, obtained percent-
age rights to the furs harvested by the coastal states, Russia and the United States. These
designated private entities to harvest and market the furs.^^ The private vessels newly
excluded from high seas sealing were compensated.
Apart from the seal treaty, the pattem of fishing treaties and conventions between
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eries. Under the treaties, bilateral commissions were created with powers to coordinate
national fishery controls, such as those over gear and the timing of openings. The
commissions strove for fair sharing by implementing implicit or explicit national quotas.
But the member states did not distribute these as individual quotas, and instead licensed
vessels to participate in the intemational fishery. (The same was to be true of the pelagic
whaling and tuna commissions.)
ICNAF, a multination postwar treaty organization to control the fisheries outside the
territorial seas of Canada and Greenland,^"* worked on somewhat similar principles. It
allotted national landing quotas. But until its very last years, its commission took little
interest in the possibility of individual vessel quotas (Christy and Scott 1965; Crutchfield
1965).
From the mid-1950s the nations were less engaged in treaties for individual stocks or
regions than in a convention for a new law of the sea, under the United Nations. For
fisheries, succeeding conventions widened the zone within which the coastal state had
exclusive fishing jurisdiction, subject to admission of foreign vessels when a coastal
fishery is not fully utilized. This latter condition means that a foreign nation obtains the
rights, which it then assigns, often allotting vessel quotas.
This has always seemed the sensible way of doing it. It was discussed among econo-
mists and others from the mid 1970s. Probably, it became a source of the individual
quota idea." It indeed can be argued that fisheries experts became familiar with the
concepts of rights-based fishing in the period when they were all involved, as commis-
sioners and administrators of intemational fishery regimes, and as advisers, students,
and critics of proposed Law of the Sea institutions.
1980s: Domestic Individual and Enterprise Quotas
The idea of individual catch quotas (point 4) in an official T.A.C. is a fairly recent
suggestion (Christy 1973; Moloney and Pearse 1979).^^ Today we find them adopted or
adapted in the sea fisheries of Iceland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Norway."
And they are probably in wider use than recognized.
Enterprise quotas, especially those that assign a quota to a processing plant served by
a number of catching vessels, are a much older idea. A sort of enterprise quota was used
in the early British Columbia salmon canning industry in the 1900s, and probably else-
where earlier. Gertenbach refers to Pilchard enterprise quotas dating from 1940 or ear-
lier. Japan also had high seas enterprise quotas as part of an immensely complicated
system discussed by Oka, Watanabe, Hasegawa, and Kasahara.^*
Comparing the Rights Characteristics of Quotas and Licenses
As a personal interest the fishery, the individual transferable catch quota had much more
of at least four of the six characteristics in Figure 1 than had licenses under orthodox
fishery regulation regimes.
The first is duration. This is measurable in seasons or years. A short duration means
that renewal or extension is costly or doubtful. A more permanent duration is valuable to
holders of both licenses and rights in that it reduces the renewal costs and uncertainty
and also raises the profitability of "round-about-methods": long-term investment or
personal commitment. In a fishery, without a permanent right fishermen will be unwill-
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ingness, however, would be reduced if their capital were versatile enough to be used in
other fisheries, or were salvageable at low cost.)
The values of the six characteristics are clearly not independent. In the case or
duration, an increase in permanence raises the values of all other characteristics. This is
particularly true of the duration of an individual quota. Compared to a license, an
individual quota gives fishermen the advantages of exclusivity, transferability, and divisi-
bility, as noted below. But the fishermen will not invest to take advantage of these if the
right is too ephemeral. In particular, consider that a catch quota regime has the potential
to be developed into a regime where the owners not only harvest but also manage the
fishstock or biomass (discussed below.) Clearly, this regime would require a long-mn
engagement by committed fishermen, and would be next to impossible if quotas were
valid for only a few years.
A second important characteristic is exclusivity. Economists actually use this word in
several senses. Here its meaning can be conveyed by the statement that the amount of
exclusivity in an individual's right to use a common property resource is increased as the
number of persons holding overlapping rights is reduced. Thus exclusivity in a fishing
right could be measured by the inverse of the number of fishermen with whom a right
holder would have to contract to achieve least-cost harvesting of, say, the TAC, MEY, or
MSY. By this or any equivalent definition, an increase in exclusivity tends to be valuable
to fishermen in that it reduces operating clashes and assists coordination among those
who hold similar rights. A quota regime increases exclusivity.
An increment of exclusivity can reduce the cost of fishing. Under extreme stationary
conditions, a quota holder could be a miniature sole owner of the amount of fish in his
quota, and his fishing costs would be at their lowest. But in more realistic circumstances
fish are migratory or wandering, and regulators are unpredictably opening and closing
fishing grounds. Under these conditions, the introduction of exclusive catch quotas
would lower costs of racing and competitive vessel investment below those of mere
license holders.
Exclusivity in a right also promotes an attitude conscious of partnership or interde-
pendence among right holders. With free entry gone and rivalry in catching suppressed,
opportunities to work together become each owner's chief opportunities for individual
gain. In the short run this can lead to cooperation in locating and even in landing fish. In
the long mn it can lead to cooperation in managing, protecting, and increasing the
fishstock itself.
A third important characteristic is transferability. It is numerically measurable by the
number of persons to whom a right may be sold or rented. Under primitive open access
licensing systems, transferability is unimportant for anyone can get a new license. Under
a limited licensing regime, boat license transferability is often officially banned, but may
be permitted in practice, perhaps by being transferred with a vessel or a personal fishing
license. Quotas are usually transferable: hence the name individual transferable quotas,
or ITQs.
Both quota and limited licensing regimes gain from tradeability. For example, it
allows fishermen both geographical and occupational mobility to take advantage of their
persona! comparative advantages. Not less important, as it allows them to take their
gains when they retire from the fishery, they are not deterred during their active career
from investing in technology or in the fishstock. But a quota regime gets more than
mobility gains from transferability, as explained later.
The fourth characteristic is divisibility. It can have two meanings here. One is the
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rights specified perhaps by season, region, ground, species, age, or other classification.
Another applies only to an ITQ regime. It is the ability to divide the amount of a quota
into smaller amounts, and to transfer some of these to others.
Quotas gain greatly in value from transferability and divisibility.
First, quota trading can be used to reconcile fixed quotas with an uncertain total
availability of catch. In almost every fishery, a TAC is predicted and officially set for
every season. Each individual quota is some percentage of this. Every fisherman knows,
however, that the ex-ante TAC will over- or underestimate the actual fish run. The best
regimes make some attempt to adjust the quotas toward the end of the season to prevent
waste or overfishing. Without transferability there is a difficult problem of quickly
allocating the deficiency or excess among quota holders. With transferability and divisi-
bility the problem is reduced. Individual fishermen can guess what the final quota will
be. Those who want to go home can sell or rent their remaining quota. Those who
overshoot can buy or rent quota for the difference. Tradeability and divisibility allow the
fishermen to choose their own adjustment to TAC uncertainty.
Second, quota trading eases the by-catch problem. It is not easy for fishermen to land
an exact mix of species. Often they are not rewarded for attempting exactness. Compared
to a licensing system, a regime of individual quotas for each species does give fishermen
some incentive to work out how to land a given mix; they must throw overboard fish for
which they have no quota. A regime of transferable and divisible quotas can be of even
greater value. Fishermen can enter the market to buy or rent quota for everything they
land. Now it becomes possible to penalize waste as part of a regulated quota system's
enforcement; every fish caught must be landed; every fish landed must be in a quota.
Transferability makes it all feasible: some fishermen can specialize in particular
species, whereas others continue to go for any old mixed catches. Quota markets and/or
fish markets later reconcile quotas and catches.
Throughout this brief survey of the property characteristics of ITQ regimes as evi-
denced by the characteristics of ITQs, in merely indicating why these characteristics
might have value to quota holders I have attempted to avoid overstating the social value
of a quota regime. For there are costs and drawbacks.
Not the least of the costs have not been mentioned at all; transactions and enforce-
ment costs. Some of these may fall with an increase in characteristics, but others may
rise. Some combinations of characteristics may therefore create ITQ markets that are too
costly to be operational. Thus it may be possible that regulated or limited license re-
gimes, without ITQs, could achieve benefits or values alluded to above at a lower total
or social cost of transactions, administration, and enforcement. Or, it may be that some
of the benefits and values are too costly to be worth going after with any regime.
Obviously not everyone will receive benefits and values. In the transition to a quota
regime, there will be redistributions. Furthermore, because it has exclusivity, the regime
will exclude some future fishermen, who can enter only at a price. If the rights are
durable and values can be capitalized and transferred, many of the rents created will
accrue permanently to the most foresighted of the first generation of fishermen, all
others being confined to a Marshallian normal profit. Finally, it must be noted that a
market system does rely on markets.^^ Nonmarket avenues of individual advantage tend
to be shut off Those who dislike private property and market trading will naturally
prefer the freedom of the characteristics of limited licensed regimes to one based on
ITQs. But the ITQ regime's reliance on markets for its benefits does not mean that ITQs
and communal ownership are incompatible. The opposite is correct, as noted in later
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Does an ITQ Regime Require Govemment Regulation?
It is almost a truism in comparative economics that under private property, markets,
instead of govemment, can regulate production. Does this broad generalization apply to
fisheries? Is a system of individual catching rights a technical substitute for public regu-
lation and management?^
Of course, ITQs are only harvesting rights. They apply only after a TAC has been
set. Thus a quota system cannot dispense with some outside means of determining each
year's TAC. Even less can they take over other aspects of managing the fishstock and its
predators and preys, nor of protecting its environment. This requires sole ownership, or
perhaps the communal and TURF fisheries described in the next section. Here we exam-
ine only those respects in which individual transferable catch quotas may, at the margin,
replace activities of public harvesting regulators.
First, control over gear types. The technical need for qualitative regulation of equip-
ment or effort is reduced when fishermen are on quotas. Because the catch is the unit of
property, the authorities must concern themselves with gear, net-type, and so on only in
connection with their long-run, selective impact on the composition of the fishstock.
Second, prevention of racing behavior. Ideally, when fishermen are on quotas, they
have every incentive to set their own pace in taking their quotas, on different days, with
different boat speeds and sizes. Far from being a racetrack under close official supervi-
sion, a fishery may take on the appearance of a peaceful common rangeland, with the
owners, rather than fishery wardens, checking on each other.
This substitution depends on the certainty of TACs. When closing of migratory and
seasonal fisheries is unpredictable, even quota-owning fishermen will seek advantage over
others by investment in racing behavior, discounting later catches heavily, and using
heavy-duty gears. This has excess investment costs of its own, and can increase two other
types of cost; those of fishing ground congestion and those of wide amplitude in month-to-
month landings. These effects of unpredictable closings can be prevented, and sometimes
are, by complex govemment control over openings, illustrating how uncertainty can lead
to a failure of private quotas to substitute technically for govemment regulation.
Third, discriminating among mixed stocks. When stocks are mixed, neither regulation
nor catch quotas can achieve the desired mix of species TACs without high enforcement
and/or contracting costs. Nevertheless, it is important to note again a point mentioned
ahove: in dealing with some by-catch situations, a system of quotas with high transferabil-
ity characteristics may substitute for intensive public regulation.
Fourth, dealing with part-time fishermen. When there is open access, and indeed
wherever racing for the catch is the mle, regulators come under pressure from fishermen
to eliminate part-time fishermen (and other participants regarded as irregular such as
foreigners, sportsmen, and native fishermen). This "function" is left to regulators be-
cause there is no one else to scale the individual quota to the amount of participation; and
it is anyway not clear that, under limited licensing, it is a legitimate ftinction. Under an
ITQ regime, this question is dealt with once and for all in setting the rules of transfer-
ability and divisibility. The concept of "part-timeness" disappears: the only exclusion
distinction between fishermen is the size of their quota. Some participants may devote
full time to one fishery and so hold a large quota in it; others may divide their year
hetween two or more fisheries, or between fishing and other pursuits, and so acquire or
hold appropriately smaller quotas.
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tion. quota owners can easily cheat and poach. Hence, far from substituting for govern-
ment enforcement, quotas need more govemment activity than, say, limited licensing.
This criticism assumes that quota owners will continue to behave as they do when
under complete govemment regulation. But the strength of the quota system may be that
it creates incentives for self-enforcement, a point made today about any commons.
Indeed the self-enforcement powers of decentralized tribal, collective, and communal
management are too often exaggerated. Nevertheless it is worth stating the main propo-
sition that possessing individual catching rights makes a fisherman unsympathetic to
poachers' actions. Sharing the ownership of the catch increases his willingness to pay to
prevent actions that reduce his own chances of catching his quota, reduce the TAC, or
reduce these in future years. Formal analysis would show that his willingness to pay will
be a positive function of the tradeability (cash value), exclusivity (group size), and
duration and quality of title (time horizon) of his present and expected future property
interest in the TAC.
It is not generally accepted that this willingness to prevent poaching and cheating
exists. Many think that poaching is the Achilles' heel of the quota system. They doubt
that fishermen, alone on the fishing grounds, will stay within their quotas just because
their time at sea and the amounts they sell or land can be observed by other fishermen
quota owners. Their analysis of self-enforcement in old fisheries suggests that the large
numbers of fishermen, and their traditions of evading regulations and of individualism,
will keep other fishermen from impeding poaching. On the poachers' side, in some large
fisheries the payoff to poaching or overfishing will easily exceed the probable penalty.
If the facts substantiate this view, the obvious conclusion, that the quota system has
no substitute for govemment enforcement, may not go far enough. If the quota system is
retained, the required enhanced govemment enforcement may be more costly than the
net benefits of the quota system. It involves checking log books, verifying alt fish
marketings and quota exchanges on land and sea, and possibly either extra observers or
reduced transferability.''
These five points show that whether a system of quotas can become a system of private
and exclusive property with its own substitutes for regulation of the fishery is largely a
question of the facts about the size, dispersion, and history of particular fisheries. There
seems no doubt that if the individual rights exist, their owners can contract with each other
to coordinate them, to perform what are now regarded as government functions.
Whether a Regime of Individual Fishery Rights Is Attractive
to Fishermen and Governments
The question of the necessity of govemment regulation under an ITQ regime is a techni-
cal one. In this section the criteria are political and social. Will an individual ITQ regime
receive political support?
Opposition in the Fishing Industry
In a political state, the possibility of a transition from licensed, regulated harvesting to
rights-based harvesting depends largely on whether the fishing industry will undergo the
transition or undermine it. By "industry" I mean individual fishemien, fishermen
groups, and fishing companies.
Take individual fishermen first. Under initial conditions they have spent mucb of302 A. Scott
their fime outracing other fishermen, outwitting regulators, disputing openings, gear
rules, and TACs, and engaging in rent-seeking behavior regarding these matters as well
as taxes, subsidies, welfare, and expenditure. Under a quota system, they would stop
racing, cooperate with enforcers, and choose their own gear, time, and place to fish. To
carve out for themselves rights to land a larger share of the TAC, they must have
recourse to a quota market. Even if they understand it they may work against it. Con-
sider three reasons:
1. Initial endowments. Their experience in old fisheries with decades of official
makeshift will not encourage them to accept their initial positions passively. In-
stead they will have strong incentives to build them up by protesting the proposed
starting allocations and procedures. In these campaigns, they may kill off the new
regime.
2. Transferability. Fishermen experienced with older, changeable govemment fish-
ing reforms will be skeptical about the permanence, exclusivity, or quaiity of the
rights they start with.^^ Therefore they will hedge against their disappearance by
not using the transferability characteristic.
3. Self-enforcement. Decades of evasion of and resistance to the authorities will
make them unwilling to participate in self-enforcement, thus depriving a quota
scheme of one of its strengths.
In other words, the individual fishermen's disbelief that a quota system is not just a new
kind of open-access regulation in disguise may prevent it from coming into effect.
But can't individual fishermen act collectively or politically? Collective action by the
fishermen is not only constrained by the usual free-riding abstention, but also weakened
by a diversity of goals. As law making approaches the threshold of the creation of
individual rights in existing fisheries—rights with more durability, flexibility, exclusivity,
quality of title, transferability, and divisibility—the consensus of fishermen can become
increasingly difficult to obtain. The explanation lies in life under the previous wide-
spread regulation. Regulators in the course of stock management have rationed access so
as to create secure catches for several types of gear and for vessels from different ports.
The negotiation of these arrangements leads to rivalry among the gear types and ports,
and coalesces them into quarreling interest groups. These endlessly debate their respec-
tive rights to fish in their own ways, arguing about the administrative determinations of
the catch, openings, species, and size. Under these circumstances, any group lending
support to individual, undifferentiated quotas seems bound to be opposed by other
groups.
Individual fishermen and groups and unions may be less influential in the industry's
policies than the buying and processing companies. Company behavior is usually charac-
terized as attempting to trade off prices and quantity; in this case each strikes a balance
between stability in fishing costs and prices and in its own share of the local TAC. The
former inclines them to support quotas. But the latter inclines them to give loyal support
to their own fishermen-suppliers, regardless of their gear. Probably the former motive is
the stronger; to it can be added the alleged desire of the companies to use quotas to
become, eventually, owners of the fishery.
When we examine where and how new quota systems have received fishing industry
consent, the above points are confirmed. One initial circumstance common to these
successful instances is that all fishermen are already using the same gear, often in ex-
ploiting newly available EEZs. A second is the initial concentration of political and
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multiport corporations. Under these circumstances flshermen's factions have not para-
lyzed the adoption of new regimes.
Another way of looking at support and adoption of quotas is in terms of fisherman
protection. The advent of individual rights is also the withdrawal of govemment respon-
sibility for the catch security on which many fishermen and companies have depended.
Regulation, dovetailed with other outport welfare, tax, and subsidy programs, has made
competitive fishing relatively certain and comfortable for companies, share fishermen,
and owners. For people in such fisheries increased competition through the market for
quotas is not an inviting prospect.
Opposition from Bureaucrats and Politicians
The training of economists perhaps makes them too quick to follow a single theory. In
this case it would be Stigler's capture theory of regulation: that after a decent interval a
regulated fishery is managed for the benefit of those regulated. The section just con-
cluded, on fisherman opposition to an ITQ regime, pursues this theory exclusively.
As correctives, or purgatives perhaps, let us now consider rival theories: that bu-
reaucratic regulation is conducted for the benefit of the bureaucrats, and that politicians
who introduce new regimes do so for the sake of the extra votes entailed. Another
theory, that bureaucratic, voter, politician, or fisherman ideology lies behind fisheries
regulation is too diffuse to explore here.
As emerged in the earlier discussion of govemment regulation under limited licens-
ing, bureaucrats have been essential to fish stock management. They are consequently
extremely infiuential in decision making about changes in management regimes."
Whether one can expect these professionals and administrators to favor or oppose substi-
tuting an ITQ regime for licenses involves the following points
1. Goals. In making their day-to-day decisions, managers undoubtedly have regard
to biological, budgetary, distributive, public relations, and efficiency criteria, and
probably others. With experience of their difficulties in balancing these forces,
they will be deeply skeptical that their complex role can be assumed by a rights-
based, competitive system.
2. Jobs. If the characteristics of individual and collective rights can be substituted
for bureaucratic decision making and enforcement, the demand for specialized
administrators should decline.
One would, using modem theories of bureaucracy, predict that on these two scores
bureaucrats would oppose the introduction of rights-based fishing regimes. But one
would be wrong. My observation is that the new systems, where they exist, have been
steered into place, or at least welcomed, by public servants. What goes wrong with the
theories? Perhaps, as to the first point above, many management bureaucrats, over-
whelmed with the difficulty of what they are asked to do, have open minds about new
regimes for handling it. As for the second point, we must note that bureaucrats are now
less wedded to a single job, or ministry, than formerly. The number of biologically
trained specialists whose future depends on extensive regulatory control over fishing is
now relatively small. Others even now will expect to be promoted into other bureaus
rather than to spend a life as a regulator. As versatile managers and administrators in any
part of the government, they will not view an ITQ regime as an alarming threat. For
them, the setting up of the new system might, for a few years at least, be a satisfying
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Politicians cannot be characterized as professionally favorable or unfavorable to a
system of rights-based fisheries. Many politicians have observably won support by ar-
ranging for the issuance of new fishing licenses, but they could find other ways to gain
friends if the licenses provided more of the characteristics of private use rights in the
public lands.
1. Pressure groups and political action. Individual fishermen are generous with their
advice, but are minorities in most ridings. As for organized pressure groups, as
already suggested, fishermen may remain divided and difficult to read.
2. Party policy and ideology. I suggested in Scott (1987) that a politician's goveming
party will be unconcerned about fisheries policy, so that quotas will usually be a
local issue. It is conceivable, however, that a politician's party would see it as a
privatization issue, and therefore become involved.
Fishermen are as thoughtful as any other part of the electorate, and perhaps more likely
to speak out to bureaucrats and politicians. But they have difficulties with collective
action, and electoral institutions aggravate these difficulties when they attempt political
participation. Perhaps the only prediction that one could make is that fishery politicians
are likely to be unusually dependent on fishery professionals, and so to refiect their
views on rights-based fishery management.
An ITQ Regime for Harvesting or Stock Management?
Whether individual property rights will catch on depends on the function they are to
perform. An ITQ harvesting regime, requiring continued regulation, is best seen as only
a brief stage in the development of management. Its evolution can be expected to con-
tinue until each owner has a share in management decisions regarding the catch, and,
further still, until he has an owner's share in management of the biomass and its environ-
ment.
The expected evolution would begin with joint harvesting. Their ownership of indi-
vidual catch quotas gives fishermen an independent position from which they can form
owners' alliances or committees. These can organize to coordinate searching activity and
reduce wasteful racing; jointly negotiate with regulators over TACs, by-catches, open-
ings, quota markets, enforcement records, and other day-to-day issues;^ndjnobilize
self-enforcement to reduce poaching—
TTTsmt just a hypothesis that flsheaaan_wilUwQiiLiQgether when they have an
individual sense, of exclusiYity_in the harvest. As already mentioned, there were
"stinted" medieval commons of fisheries, probably not very numerous, where the vil-
lage divided the seasonal catch and watched over the catching. More to the point, recent
common property literature not only suggests that commons of pasture and open fields
were jointly managed in the middle ages, but also that similar regimes operate in devel-
oping countries today. To foster this is the aim of the TURF (Territorial Use and Rights
to Fisheries) concept. The FAO, its sponsor, expects it to reduce or replace administra-
tive centralization, improve rule making and rule compliance, and reduce friction be-
tween adjoining fishing communities.
It goes without saying that the TURF and ITQ regime ideas are not in confiict. It
may be easier to form a TURF if initially villagers pool their own ITQs, so holding the
part, or even all, of a larger TAC in common. How they catch this will thereafter be
their own business: freehold private rights, short tenancies or contracts, or customary
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Beyond harvesting, such pools could become a stage in the process toward integrat-
ing sole ownership year-to-year catch control with permanent stock protection and en-
hancement. Quota holders, collectively, will naturally take a more long run interest in
the betterment of "their" fish stock or stocks when their individual rights have duration,
exclusivity, and transferability.
Thus an individual quota may become something like a share in a growing enter-
prise. Naturally, investments will primarily be in stock: long-run management to im-
prove numbers, local stocks, and size and age composition. But quota holders can also
jointly make other investments. Here are some suggestions. They may jointly or with
neighbors undertake to provide search, enforcement, and protection personnel and ves-
sels; an electronic quota clearinghouse; and agreements conceming overlapping and
shared stocks and migratory species. Finally, they may contract with local govemments
and landowners conceming waste disposal, habitat improvement activities, and possibili-
ties of investing in land or improvements themselves.
The sources of opposition to such a transformation will be different from those
considered above in connection with the initial formation of ITQ harvesting regimes.
Space does not allow another set of conjectures, but two rather obvious matters should
be emphasized. First, in general, opposition from factions and minorities within the
fishing community should be less strenuous. Once ITQ harvesting regimes are in exis-
tence, the diversity of fisherman vested interests will tend to disappear. Whereas there
will be, no doubt, new difficulties in finding agreement on the extent and expense of
long-run management, the ITQ regime tends to emphasize common, rather than individ-
ual, goals and solutions. When fishing companies are included in the community from
which objection may arise, it appears that they, too, once an ITQ regime is already in
being, should be supportive.
My second point concedes that stock management is more difficult to organize than
harvesting. The geographical difficulties may work against ITQ owners assuming re-
sponsibility for "their own" fish. Many of the world's most important "fisheries"
consist of different stocks having common habitats or intersecting migratory paths. Their
management cannot easily be conducted on a single fishing ground. More than one
region and national jurisdiction will be involved, and specialists in particular stocks will
be interfering with each other. This happens today under open access and will continue
under licensing, ITQ harvesting regimes, and under ITQ management pooling. Although
here and there nationally and biologically oriented regimes have made a start in dealing
with these important problem areas, these can also create networks of vested interests in
partial management regimes opposed to broadening the scope of ITQs.
But the ITQ may be self-propelled. Since it is an individual property right, it is like a
building block that its owner can pile with others in various ways. Some ways of assem-
bling them into sole ownerships are better than others, resulting in different intemal
management and information costs, different external costs of infonnation and coordina-
tion, and different economies of scale in harvesting and stock enhancement. And each
altemative regime will be sponsored by different groupings of regulators and politicians.
Amid all these infiuences, what must not be forgotten is that the most influential and
permanent voice in establishing management regimes will be the owners of these build-
ings blocks, the fishermen and companies. They will not be indifferent to the ways they
are grouped, for some will yield them more rent than others. They will have an incen-
tive, as owners, to continue the pursuit of the transformation of their shares of harvest-
ing communities, into shares of fishstock managing coalitions. Once ITQs exist.306 A. Scott
they can create a force for fishermen management control that can be more durable and
persistent than shore-based vested interests in regulatory jobs.
ITQs can make ITQ regimes, and harvesting regimes can make stock management
regimes. The initial opportunities are already available, but the new fisheries-rights
literature has failed to see individual rights as the nuclei of larger sole ownership corpo-
rations or collectives. Thus it has not benefited from studies of common pool manage-
ment of other resources. The advantages and difficulties of modem collective oil-pool,
pollution emissions, pasture, and irrigation water management are rarely referred to,
although perhaps most of these have been built out of the characteristics of individual
rights.
Acknowledgments
This paper derives from Conceptual Origins of Rights-Based Fishing presented in Rey-
javik in June 1988. For underlying historical research, part of a longer study, I acknowl-
edge the help of Betty Bono, then of Harvard Law School. I am grateful to P. A. Neher,
Ragnar Amasson, Nina Mollett, Rognvaldur Hannesson, Jim Wilen, Trond Bjorndal,
Gary Libecap, Kim Davidson, Peter H. Pearse, and the editor and anonymous referees
of this joumal for many helpful discussions and comments.
Notes
1. The details are well described in papers on modem policies in Iceland, Norway, Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand.
2. The class distribution aspect has sometimes been considered. See my 1956 FAO paper and
later substantial contributions by Martin Weitzman and Paul Samuelson. The second question is
usually ducked by economists, and is dealt with politically by opposing fisheries groups.
3. For example, each might run from 0 to 100 percent. Other writers have the same idea, but
indicate the amount in vague and rather value-laden terms or units such as "incomplete," "imper-
fect," "attenuated," or "property-ness."
4. Exclusivity is also called specificity. Quality of title is an idea close to enforceability.
Transferability has been called assignability, exchangeability, and iradeability. Divisibility is a
characteristic than can be subdivided into narrower characteristics such as powers of creating joint
ownership, dividing land spatially or by function, and constructing a temporal succession of rights
to use or enjoy one parcel.
5. For example, the amount of exclusivity enjoyed by the owner would depend not only on
what interest he had, but on the number of other potential functions or activities of the river at
each location. A right of fishery does not normally protect its owner from disturbance by river
navigation, but it might nevertheless give him 100 percent exclusivity if the water was too shallow
for navigation.
6. The characteristics and the diagram are developed in forthcoming work. A starshaped
figure can also be drawn to illustrate the general differences between two interests in all locations.
Economists will understand that the measured dimensions are not necessarily independent.
7. Much of this material was assembled in 1984 with the great assistance of Betty Bono, then
at Harvard Law School. Some of it was published in Scott 1986.
8. Or, for that matter, whether the fish was a "royal" such as a sturgeon; or was a shellfish.
9. Our chief sources of information are legal monographs such as the well-known Moore
1903. Although they go further than the usual textbook in pronouncing on what was "customary,"
they fall well short of what is needed. Legal historians rarely see themselves as social historians
and do not use their materials to help describe or analyze medieval society and economy. Conse-Property Development in the Fishery 307
quently, one must be cautious about accepting historical chapters that attempt to simplify the
ancient complexity of fishing rights. The scholarly authors have no statistical basis for their
descriptions.
10. MacGrady (1975) reviewing the historical evidence, says that the king's decision not to
continue disposing of his tidal fishing rights was an extension of the scope of his agreement with
the barons not to allow weirs or other obstructions to navigation in such waters. In the Victorian
case Neill vs. Percival (1882), the evidence was reviewed. It concluded that prior to Norman
times the public had a right to fish tidal waters. This eventually conflicted with the crown's
undoubted right to grant fisheries in most such waters. In the Magna Carta and later statutes, the
conflict resolved this in favor of public right. The literature is silent on why non-English European
jurisdictions also resolved the issue in favor of a public right.
11. Grotius explained this clearly in 1609. As a result, most nations dropped their claims to
high seas sovereignty and to exclusive rights over ocean fisheries. Most eventually claimed instead
the freedom of navigation on the high seas.
12. That is what eventually happened with hunting rights in the great forests. As there is not
much resemblance between forest law and fisheries law, I will not push this comparison. How-
ever, note that both are concemed with harvesting wildlife. Both were dealt with by the Magna
Carta. which established in the next 50 years a pattem of crown and private rights that was to
endure for centuries.
13. If a grant of severed fishery did not explicitly include rights of access to the fishing place,
the courts might find that nevertheless some right to use the banks was implicitly granted.
14. See, e.g., the very short Chapter XII in Moore and Moore (1903).
15. When the lord of the manor moved to sell mineral rights in sites under the manorial
wasteland, the courts usually found that mineral rights in the parish wasteland were not held in
common by the people. There may be case evidence about the attempted sale by the lord of fishing
rights within the parish. The evidence at enclosure proceedings may also be helpful.
16. For example, John Hatcher (1970), using the medieval records of the royal Duchy of
Cornwall, shows annual cash revenues to the duchy from what appears to be fisheries in villages it
owned.
17. Crutchfieid's first fishery paper actually emphasised labor and industrial relations. Mine
(Scott 1955a) dealt with internalized management by a sole ownership, including intertemporal
allocation.
18. For forward-looking rationalizations of proposed regulations, see Sol Sinclair in
Hamlisch (1962). and Pearse (1979). Some history in one country is to be found in Scott and
Neher (1981), and across-country comparisons are in Retting (1984).
19. That is, few that I know of. Campbell, writing of Bay of Fundy herring rights, and other
authors of the papers contributed to the Scott and Neher report, do touch on this theme; see Scott
and Neher (1981, final chapter).
20. There might be an incentive in a small fishery in which, by definition, the owner of one
vessel could change the size of the stock appreciably.
21. My own observations on the difficulty of collective political action are summarized in
Miles et al. (1986).
22. States did award high seas fishing monopolies to their own countrymen; these were
intended to exclude other fishermen under the same fiag.
23. For references, see Christy and Scott (1965); for a discussion of the original issue, see
Waite (1985); for an economic analysis of the necessity and success of the final treaty, see Pater-
son and Wilen (1947).
24. ICNAF stands for the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries.
25. I remember the idea being widely accepted at an early 1970s meeting of the LOS Institute
in Rhode Island, under the chairmanship of L. Alexander.
26. I would be interested in knowing about earlier references than 1973. In Sinclair's contri-
bution to the Hamlisch (1962) volume, he refers to conversations with Jim Crutchfield and myself.
Elsewhere in the volume I refer to discussions with Sinclair about the similarity of transferable308 A. Scott
input licenses and transferable tobacco output quotas (pp. 319, 336). Furthemiore, throughout the
500-page volume there is considerable discussion of taxes on the output. But nowhere does any
economist or administrator write down thoughts about an individual output quota. I have already
expressed doubt that it was much employed as "stinting" by those who managed medieval com-
mon fisheries (Gregory, 1967).
27. For detailed descriptions see LUbum (1986). Amason in Scott and Neher (1981), and
Robinson (1985). Much of this literature is, however, necessarily concemed with the problems
encountered in the transition to a catch-quota system.
28. The salmon fishery is discussed by Gregory and Bames (1939) and Crutchfield and
Pontecorvo (1969) and others referring to the Alaskan fishery. The others are taken up in chapters
of the Hamlisch (1962) volume.
29. The text does not deal with the efficiency or competitiveness of markets, I believe thai
first-best efficiency is out of reach here, so that it is necessary to predict in detail how particular
regimes would work out. The benefits or advantages mentioned in the text are not those of
achieving a Pareto optimum in the allocation of inputs between various fishing activities and rest
of the economy. As for competitiveness, the question arises whether marketable quotas would
become more concentrated in ownership, say by large companies, unions, or other groupings,
than would vessels under open access or licenses under limited licensing. The answer is not
obvious to me.
30. In the longer conference paper from which this derived, I attempted to sustain a complex
comparison of the dependence of limited licensing and ITQ regimes on government management
and regulation. This shortened text deals only with ITQ dependence.
31. For example, both Peter Pearse (1979a) and Parzival Copes (1986) have warned of the
excessive enforcement costs of quotas when sales and runs are unpredictable.
32. Under license-limitation, politicians have been known in some jurisdictions to award
more licenses than originally announced or promised. These naturally cause a decline in rights'
original market values. The fisherman's best recourse is to prevent a quota system being initiated
in the first place.
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